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RECENT DECISIONS
of record had an inherent power to appoint such assistants as they
deemed necessary to expedite and properly conduct judicial busi-
ness.20 A court's power to determine its requirements for function-
ing efficiently and performing its duties was again considered in In
re Court Room,2' in which a circuit court had held that Milwaukee
County had to provide it with suitable quarters. The supreme court
agreed, holding that in order to preserve the full and free exercise
of the judicial functions of the court, the circuit court could de-
mand reasonable quarters. Finally, in the case of State ex rel.
Reynolds v. County Court,22 wherein a Kenosha county judge had
an air conditioner installed because the heat in the courtroom
made it difficult to conduct hearings, the supreme court held that
this was a matter of necessity. Although the question wasn't raised
in the vase, the supreme court held that the court had the power
to determine the necessity for air conditioning.
-In view of these cases, it would appear that Wisconsin sub-
scribes to the position that if an expenditure is reasonably neces-
sary for the court's efficient and effective operation, funds may be
allocated for it by judicial order.
ROBERT W. MUREN
Municipal Corporations: Recovery From Municipality for Value of
Services Furnished Without Compliance with Statutory Bidding
Requirements-The Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in Blum v.
City of Hillsboro' that the plaintiff contractor had a cause of ac-
tion for unjust enrichment against the defendant municipality as a
result of services performed under an amended municipal contract
which, as amended, was rendered invalid for failure to comply with
the procedure required by the competitive bidding statute.2 The
20. In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
21. 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
22. 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960).
1. 49 Wis. 2d 667, 183 N.W.2d 47 (1971).
2. WIs. STAT. § 62.15(1) (1969) provides:
All public construction, the estimated cost of which shall exceed $1,000 shall be let
by contract to the lowest responsible bidder; all other public construction shall be
let as the council may direct. The council may also by a vote of three-fourths of all
the members-elect provide by ordinance that any class of public construction or any
part thereof may be done directly by the city without submitting the same for bids.
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original contract was for excavation on a dam and lake in the
amount of $47,438.50, and was let pursuant to the provisions of the
bidding statute. This originally valid contract was subsequently
modified, however, when the mayor and council members of the
municipality asked the contractor to do additional lake bottom
excavation at the same unit price of 40 cents per cubic yard as
agreed upon in the original contract. All the services required by
the municipality were fully performed by the contractor pursuant
to the supplemented contract and the contractor sought to recover
the total price for his services, $153,902.50. The municipality made
partial payment of this sum, in the amount of $81,840.00, but
refused to pay the balance of $72,062.50. Plaintiff then brought
suit, but the trial court sustained defendant's demurrers. The issue
raised on appeal was whether a cause of action would lie against
the city under theories of unjust enrichment, 3 equitable estoppel,4
or promissory estoppel5 for additional work done on a public works
3. In City of Wauwatosa v. Milwaukee County, 22 Wis. 2d 184, 193, 125 N.W.2d 386,
390 (1963), the court stated:
Under the doctrine of unjust enrichment the basis for recovery is the duty of a person,
who has received property or money or other things of value under such circumstan-
ces that in equity and in good morals he ought not to keep, to return the property
or its value-not his promise, agreemeht or intention.
See also Weber v. Sunset Ridge, Inc., 269 Wis. 120, 68 N.W.2d 706 (1955); Probst v. City
of Menasha, 245 Wis. 90, 13 N.W.2d 504 (1944); Federal Corp. v. Radtke, 229 Wis. 231,
281 N.W. 921 (1938).
4. The court, in Bratt v. Peterson, 31 Wis. 2d 447, 454, 143 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1966),
defined equitable estoppel as follows: "Estoppel consists of action or nonaction on the part
of the one against whom the estoppel is asserted . . . which induces reliance by another
. . . either in the form of action or non-action, to the detriment of the latter." In addition
to good faith reliance, there must be such inequitable conduct as to amount to fraud to
warrant application of the doctrine of estoppel. McKenna v. State Highway Comm'n, 28
Wis. 2d 179, 135 N.W.2d 827 (1965). Application of the doctrine involves a denial of the
offending party's right to show existing facts, on the ground that justice will thereby be
promoted. Sparks v. Kuss, 195 Wis. 378, 216 N.W. 929 (1928).
5. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even
though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and
in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the
perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc.,
26 Wis. 2d 683, 193 N.W.2d 267 (1965), the court adopted § 90 of the Restatement of
Contracts as correctly setting forth the rule of promissory estoppel in Wisconsin. Section
90 states:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebear-
ance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
See also Mortgage Associates, Inc. v. Monona Shores, Inc., 47 Wis. 2d 171, 177 N.W.2d
340 (1970); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956).
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contract which failed to comply with the compulsory procedure of
the competitive bidding statute.
A municipality has no power to make contracts for public
improvements unless it proceeds in the manner prescribed by law, 6
and any contract entered into without following statutory or
charter provisions is void.7 Failure to comply with these mandatory
provisions may prevent recovery on any theory." Noncompliance
with statutory or charter procedures has barred recovery on con-
tracts for the use of patented materials or processes. Municipal
agreements to allow claims for damages or additional work by a
contractor also have been held illegal as a result of failure to
comply with certain legislative mandates. 10 Even substantial com-
pliance with compulsory statutory procedure may not be sufficient
to allow recovery on the contract. However, it may not be neces-
6. For example, Wis. STAT. § 62.09(10)(f) (1969) requires the municipal comptroller to
"countersign all contracts with the city if the necessary funds have been provided to pay
the liability that may be incurred thereunder, and no contract shall be valid until so counter-
signed." Wis. STAT. § 62.15(12) (1969) also requires the comptroller to countersign before
the contract becomes valid. In this regard, see Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson, 1 Wis. 2d
148, 85 N.W.2d 663 (1957); Lurye v. State, 221 Wis. 68, 265 N.W. 221 (1936). Wis. STAT.
§ 62.12(6)(c) (1969) provides that no city may enter a contract unless it is authorized by a
majority of the city council. Wis. STAT. § 62.15 (1969) requires the Board of Public Works
to advertise for bids for work on all public construction, the estimated cost of which exceeds
$1,000.
7. Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 559, 280 N.W. 320 (1938).
8. A municipal contract beyond the scope of the municipality's corporate power is ultra
vires and void. Center Drainage Dist. v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 33 Wis. 2d 294, 147 N.W.2d
245 (1964); Kiel v. Frank Shoe Mfg. Co., 245 Wis. 292, 14 N.W.2d 164 (1944).
9. WIs. STAT. § 62.15(7) (1969) sets forth a procedure for municipalities wishing to
arrange to have a patented article, material or process available to contractors bidding on
construction projects. Compliance with the statute is mandatory. Neacy v. City of Milwau-
kee, 171 Wis. 311, 176 N.W. 871 (1920); Cawker v. City of Milwaukee, 133 Wis. 35, 113
N.W. 417 (1907).
10. Wxis. STAT. § 66.295 (1969) authorizes municipalities, under certain circumstances,
to pay for public work, done in good faith, despite unenforceability of the applicable
contracts. In Wilcox v. Porth, 154 Wis. 422, 143 N.W. 165 (1913), the court held that failure
to verify a claim rendered void any agreement by the municipality to pay the claim since
the municipality's charter gave it the authority to acknowledge and pay only verified claims.
See also Lee v. City of Racine, 64 Wis. 231, 25 N.W. 33 (1885).
11. In Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 559, 280 N.W. 320 (1938), the plaintiff
sought to enjoin the municipality from making further payment on a contract alleged to be
void as a result of the failure by the Board of Public Works to run advertisements for bids
according to statutory mandates. The court agreed with the plaintiffs' position:
If as argued in this case it is held that because it does not affirmatively appear that
any taxpayer has sustained a loss or has been injured by the failure to advertise for
the minimum length of time prescribed, payment should not be enjoined, the court
in every case where the provisions of the statute are disregarded will be called upon
1972]
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sary to comply with every incidental provision of a particular stat-
ute in order to negotiate a valid contract.12 In this regard, it is most
important to determine whether non-compliance with a particular
provision violated that procedure which the legislature intended to
be mandatory.
Wisconsin formerly adhered to the majority view 13 that a mu-
nicipal contract which failed to comply with the bidding statute
was invalid, and, thus, contractors have been denied the right to
sue either directly under the contract14 or on the quasi-contractual
theory of unjust enrichment. 5 The principle reason for such a posi-
tion has been to insure fulfillment of the purpose of the bidding
statute, which is to prevent fraud, collusion, favoritism and im-
providence in the administration of public business, as well as to
to determine whether or not substantial injury has been sustained. No one will know
in such cases whether the contract is valid or void until the matter has been settled
by the courts. The conditions under which a municipality may contract will then be
fixed not by the legislature but by the court.
228. Wis. at 564-65, 280 N.W. at 323. However, while the court recognized a "hands off"
judicial policy regarding such areas of municipal action presently subject to express legisla-
tive control, it, nevertheless, made clear that it would not be completely without power if
the circumstances were appropriate:
Whether a court of equity will exercise its powers in cases where the money has been
paid out is quite a different question than whether the court should exercise its
powers to prevent payment. In the first case the court determines upon what consid-
eration its equitable powers should be exercised. That is a judicial question. In the
second case the question is whether a valid mandate of the legislature shall be upheld.
That is a matter not committed to the discretion of the court.
228 Wis. at 565, 280 N.W. at 323. By the Blum decision, the court apparently has altered
the position under consideration. Instead of considering whether a valid mandate of the
legislature should be upheld, the court in Blum invoked its equitable discretion, despite the
fact that the contested sum had not been paid, and determined that some relief could be
given without defeating a valid mandate of the legislature.
12. In Bechihold, the court also said that failure to comply with every "incidental
provision" of § 62.15, that is, those provisions not essential to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose, would not necessarily invalidate the contract. 228 Wis. at 564, 280 N.W.
at 323. While the court specifically indicated § 62.15, it would seem logical that such
language would extend to other statutory provisions prescribing procedures to be followed
in negotiating municipal contracts.
13. 10 E. McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.28, at 321 (3d ed. 1966);
Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1164 (1970).
14. Bechthold v. City of Wauwatosa, 228 Wis. 559, 280 N.W. 320 (1938).
15. Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 655, 286 N.W. 546 (1939);
Shulse v. City of Mayville, 223 Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 643 (1937) (recognizing the rule);
Journal Printing Co. v. City of Racine, 210 Wis. 222, 246 N.W. 425 (1933); Wagner v. City
of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 328, 220 N.W. 207 (1928); Cawker v. Central Bitulithic Paving
Co., 140 Wis. 25, 121 N.W. 88 (1909); Chippewa Bridge Co. v. City of Durand, 122 Wis.
85, 99"N.W. 603 (1904) (apparently recognizing the rule).
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insure that the municipality receives the best work and supplies at
the most reasonable price. 6 In Blum, the court recognized that to
permit recovery under the doctrines of either equitable or promis-
sory estoppel would defeat the purpose of the statute, since these
doctrines, if recognized, would compensate the contractor accord-
ing to the agreed contract price. 7 However, while only a minority
of the jurisdictions allow unjust enrichment as a basis of recovery
in such situations, the trend is in this direction since it has been
recognized that unjust enrichment can be remedied, while not de-
feating the purpose of the bidding statute, by establishing limita-
tions on the measure of damages recoverable. 8 With this in mind
the court adopted the minority position in the following respect:
We here conclude that when work has been performed for a
municipality under a contract which is malum prohibitum and
not malum in se, which contract is entered into in good faith and
is devoid of any bad faith, fraud or collusion, and where the
statute imposes no penalty, a cause of action based upon the
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment can be maintained. 9
Wisconsin's prior position, which denied recovery under unjust
enrichment for the reasonable value to the municipality of work
completed pursuant to an invalid contract, was not completely
reversed. The court, apparently conscious of the "hands off' judi-
cial policy regarding areas of municipal action presently subject to
expressed legislative control,20 sought to allow the plaintiff limited
16. The provisions of statutes, charters and ordinancei requiring competitive bidding
in the letting of municipal contracts are for the purpose of inviting competition, to
guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption, and to
secure the best work or supplies at the lowest price practicable ....
10 E. McQuILN, supra note 13, § 29.29, at 321.
17. 49 Wis. 2d at 676, 183 N.W.2d at 52. Under the doctrines of equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel, the municipality would be estopped to deny the validity of the contract.
Therefore, application of these doctrines would permit recovery at the contract price. Ut-
schig v. McClone, 16 Wis. 2d 506, 114 N.W.2d 854 (1962); 28 Am. JUR. 2D Estoppel and
Waiver § 33 (1971).
18. As the court recognized, it has been pointed out by other authority that: "Quasi-
contractual recovery will impose upon a municipality no greater liability, and the removal
of profits will discourage repeated violations." 1 C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW §- 10.27, at 755-56 (1967). However, the court appears to have deemed it necessary to
go a step further to insure that allowing recovery will not defeat the purpose of the bidding
statute by excluding from the amount of recovery not merely profits, but "profits including
overhead expense." 49 Wis. 2d at 674, 183 N.W.2d at 50.
19. 49 Wis. 2d at 673, 183 N.W.2d at 50.
20. In Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 328, 331, 220 N.W. 207, 208 (1928),
the court recognized that:
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recovery without defeating the purpose of the bidding statute by
allowing recovery for unjust enrichment subject to certain pre-
scribed limitations:
The question is not how much the plaintiff has parted with, but
how much has the municipality benefited.
In this case, the measure of damages should be limited by at
least two factors: (1) Recovery should be limited to an amount
which represents the actual cost to the plaintiff, without allowing
profits including overhead expense, and (2) in no event should it
exceed the unit cost of the original contract. Subject to these
limitations, any recovery would be limited to the value of the
actual benefit conferred as distinguished from the reasonable
value of the work performed and materials furnished by theOlaintiff. 21
In such a case, the contractor clearly will not be allowed to
recover the reasonable value of his materials or services provided.
Instead, it appears that recoverable damages will be limited to the
least of the three measures: actual benefit conferred, unit cost of
the original contract, or actual cost excluding profit and overhead
elements. With the adoption of these alternate limitations, the
purpose of the bidding is not defeated by allowing recovery for
unjust enrichment. By restricting compensation to the "actual ben-
efit conferred, ' 22 any excessive cost to the municipality due to
inefficient management by the contractor is substantially elimi-
The law requiring contracts to be let to the lowest bidder is based upon public
economy, and originated, perhaps, in the distrust of public officers whose duty it is
to make contracts. It is of great importance to taxpayers, and ought not to be
frittered away by exceptions . . . .The legislature having seen fit to hedge about
municipal action by restrictions so obviously of value to the body politic, it is not
for the courts to alter or vary them. Courts have'no authority to throw the law into
a melting pot, and recast it at pleasure.
See also Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 591, 81 N.W. 864 (1900).
21. 49 Wis. 2d at 674, 183 N.W.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
22. In contract law, it is said that a valuable consideration for a promise may consist
of an actual benefit to the promisor, in which case "actual benefit" means that the promisor
has, in return for his promise, acquired some legal right to which he would not otherwise
have been entitled. Irving v. Irwin, 133 Cal. App. 374, 24 P.2d 215 (1933); Woolum v.
Sizemore, 267 Ky. 384, 102 S.W.2d 323 (1937). The limitation of recovery to the "actual
benefit conferred" in this instance appears to have been intended to be a generic limitation
under which the two more specific limitations, actual cost and unit cost, would fall. The
court distinguished actual benefit conferred from reasonable value. Actual benefit conferred
would only consist of that value of the materials or services as enjoyed by the municipality,
and would not take into account any considerations of worth as determined by the
contractor.
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nated. By the further restriction to "original unit cost," 2 the mu-
nicipality, at least theoretically, is insured of obtaining work and
supplies at the most reasonable price. Finally, by totally eliminat-
ing profits, including overhead allocations, in determining "actual
cost,"24 compliance with the statute should be effectively encour-
aged such that the fundamental legislative purpose behind the bid-
ding statute will be fulfilled. The court, having embarked upon a
relatively uncharted sea of recognizing recovery for unjust enrich-
ment of a municipal contract rendered invalid for failure to comply
with statutory procedure, has attempted by these limitations to
narrowly define their course, and, in the final analysis, appears to
have arrived at a just result without defeating the legislative
mandate.
It is noteworthy that several methods of recovery may be avail-
able to one seeking relief under a contract which does not strictly
comply with the bidding statute or other compulsory statutory
provisions.25 For example, one may sue on the basis of the contract
alone and recover the full contract price if such contract was
awarded for the repair and reconstruction of public facilities under
23. It is not altogether clear whether the announcement of this limitation to the unit
cost of the original contract presumes the existence of a modified contract and requires an
originally valid contract as a condition precedent to any recovery at all. Although it is true
that good faith might be more apparent in the case where there was an original agreement
which complied with the bidding statute and was only rendered in.valid by a subsequent
agreement which did not, there seems to be no compelling reason for a blanket denial of
recovery in all cases of initial invalidity.
24. Actual cost and reasonable value are not synonymous. Schacht v. Oriental Storage
& Transfer Co., 155 Wis. 121, 143 N.W. 1058 (1913). See also Boehck Constr. Equip. Corp.
v. O'Brien, 29 Wis. 2d 649, 139 N.W.2d 650 (1965). Reasonable value is the price which
the property or services will bring when offered for sale by one willing, but not obliged, to
sell, and bought by one who is willing, but not compelled, to purchase. Connoley v. Beyer
Crushed Rock Co., 355 Mo. 684, 689, 197 S.W.2d 653, 656 (1946). Reasonable value may
incluae a profit, whereas that would not be an element of actual cost. Herein lies the critical
distinction. In Blum, the court went beyond the limitation of actual cost by excluding "profit
including overhead expenses." Overhead expenses could properly be included as actual cost.
If a contractor seeking recovery for unjust enrichment were allowed to include overhead
expenses in determining his actual cost, he might be tempted to overestimate such overhead
expenses in an attempt to recover a limited profit. Considering that the court sought first
to insure that the statute would not be defeated in allowing recovery for unjust enrichment,
the exclusion of overhead expenses from the limitation of actual cost does not seem
unreasonable.
25. Quasi-contractual recovery in Wisconsin for services rendered pursuant to invalid
municipal contracts is given exhaustive consideration in Comment, Municipal Corpora-
tions: Remedies of the Private Contractor Against a Wisconsin Municipality Where the
Contract is Ultra Vires or Defective, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 228 (1964).
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circumstances which constituted an emergency."6 Moreover, con-
tracts may include a clause providing for increases in the quantity
of construction stipulated in the original contract, without resub-
mission for bids, by an amount not to exceed 15% of the original
contract price.27 Such a clause should always be included in a
contract where, as in the instant case, the amount of construction
or excavation to be performed under the contract is known to be
susceptible to change.28 Finally, in the case of contracts completed
prior to July 1, 1969, though the contract may have been rendered
invalid or recovery barred for any reason, one can request the
municipality to pay the "fair and reasonable value" of any benefits
it may have received and continues to retain as a result of the
contractor's efforts.29 Should all of these optional methods of re-
covery prove to be either unavailable or unsuccessful, it is now
possible to bring an action for limited damages under the theory
of unjust enrichment according to the rule announced in Blum.
JAMES W. REDMOND
26. WIs. STAT. § 62.15(b) (1969).
27. WIS. STAT. § 62.15(c) (1969).
28. It is quite clear that such a clause would not have helped the contractor in Blum
since the amount he sought to xecover was an increase substantially beyond the 15% allowed
by this section.
29. WIs. STAT. § 66.295 (1969). This remedy was not available to the plaintiff in Blum
because at the time he brought his action the statute only allowed the municipality to grant
relief for work performed prior to December 1, 1960. The statute was cited by the defendant,
however, for the proposition that its mere existence indicated that payment in the case of
an invalid contract should be at the municipality's sole discretion. The court disagreed, for
it saw "no reason why a municipality may pay a moral claim in its discretion, but should
nqt be required to." 49 Wis. 2d at 675, 183 N.W.2d at 51.
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